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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the evolution and current state of 
atmospheric monitoring on the International Space 
Station to provide context from which we can imagine a 
more advanced and integrated system. The unique 
environmental hazards of human space flight ' are 
identified and categorized into groups, taking into 
consideration the time required for the hazard to become 
a threat to human health or performance. The key 
functions of a comprehensive monitoring strategy for a 
closed ecological life support system are derived from 
past experience and a survey of currently available 
technologies for monitoring air quality. 
Finally, a system architecture is developed incorporating 
the lessons learned from ISS and other analogous 
closed life support systems. The paper concludes by 
presenting recommendations on how to proceed with 
requirements definition and conceptual design of an air 
monitoring system for exploration missions. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study began as a response to a request to identify 
the integration issues that arise in an advanced closed 
loop life support system test that have significant impacts 
on the integrated system. By asking these questions 
early in the planning for the Advanced Integration Matrix 
(AIM), a ground test facility intended to help solve the 
problems associated with keeping humans alive during 
long duration space missions, a brief window of 
opportunity is provided to incorporate the lessons 
learned from previous experiences on the ground and in 
space flight without the imposed constraints that come 
into play once the project is underway. 
The evolution of life support technologies to support 
long-duration space flight created artificial ecosystems 
for the express purpose of supporting human occupants. 
As with the natural ecosystems that support life on earth, 
these artificial systems depend on complex processes 
and energy input to maintain an otherwise unstable 
balance. The systems differ in that spacecraft systems 
contain much smaller buffers for air and water; hence, 
they afford little opportunity to cope with sudden changes 
such as a build up of harmful pollutants or a failure of a 
particular subsystem. Therefore, to ensure that 
crewmembers are protected from the inherent risks of a 
closed system, monitoring of the environment is required 
to both track system performance and alert the crew or 
ground team to unexpected health hazards. 
The information and discussion presented in this paper is 
intended to serve as a starting point to begin considering 
the requirements and architecture for an air monitoring 
system capable of meeting the needs of a long duration 
planetary mission. These needs require further definition, 
but some will not be apparent until very late in the design 
of a vehicle or habitat, when technical problems must 
sometimes be resolved by accepting the risk of a toxi& 
compound onboard. Therefore, a monitoring system 
must be flexible enough to accommodate a broad range 
of potential pollutants and concentrations. 
REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The first step in developing requirements is to identify the 
stakeholders who have an interest in the functional 
capabilities of the system. For a spacecraft air monitoring 
system, the primary stakeholders include: 
0 Toxicologist 
0 Environmental control and life support system 
engineers 
0 Flight surgeon / medical establishment 
0 Scientific and medical research community 
To better understand how requirements for individual 
compounds came into being, it is helpful to group them 
according to a few driving principles for monitoring the 
environment. The following drivers are applicable to both 
ISS and future missions: 
General hazards posed by closed environmental 
systems. These hazards are due to the artificial 
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ecology present in a closed or partially closed life 
support system. Off gassing from materials and 
lubricants are typical sources, as well as human or 
microbial metabolic products. 
Monitoring life support systems. Monitoring of life 
support processes enables fault detection, informs 
routine maintenance decisions about when to 
replace or repair components, and in some cases is 
used as feedback control for certain processes. 
Unique hazards posed by system design or 
operations. Often hazardous materials are 
permitted on the spacecraft when the benefits to the 
system outweigh the risk posed by a release. To 
ensure that any unexpected releases are detected 
before they pose a threat to crew health, routine 
broad-spectrum monitoring is necessary. 
The maximum permissible concentration of a compound 
will depend on the requirement driver, the toxicity of the 
compound, the amount of data available in the scientific 
literature, and the time to effect. These limits are 
currently set for NASA through a collaborative process 
involving the National Research Council and other 
experts, resulting in a list of Spacecraft Maximum 
Allowable Concentrations (SMACs). 
Current ISS air quality requirements are specified in a 
joint US/Russian document called the Medical 
Operations Requirements Document, SSP 50260 
(Revision B). Since similar compounds can have a 
cumulative effect on the human body, methods are 
prescribed for determining the toxicity of groups of 
compounds. These methods are described in Russian 
State Standard GOST R 50804-95 and the NASA SMAC 
Document, JSC 20584. 
ISS AIR MONITORING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
AND LESSONS LEARNED 
The International Space Station Air Monitoring system 
came about through a long process of evolution 
influenced by technical, financial, political, and 
international factors. An early split that occurred in the air 
monitoring system was essentially geographical. NASA’s 
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was assigned 
responsibility for design of the life support systems. Once 
Space Station Freedom became Alpha the new design 
required that during the first phase of assembly the 
Russian side was the primary provider of life support 
systems. Throughout these changes, the responsibility 
for protecting crew health continued to remain at the 
Johnson Space Center. Therefore, three very different 
organizations were now required to work together to 
adequately monitor and control air quality. As a result, 
each organization provides unique, independent 
hardware capabilities that together form the ISS 
monitoring system. 
SNAPSHOT OF CURRENT ISS HARDWARE - The 
current “gold standard for environmental verification on 
ISS is laboratory analysis of returned samples. Both the 
US and Russian partners have capabilities (see Table 1) 
to return samples for analysis using traditional lab 
techniques that routinely detect a number of common 
pollutants (James et al, 2001). 
Ground monitoring is effective in detecting a wide range 
of stable compounds collected at a single point in time, 
but to verify that the environment is safe over a period of 
6 month, toxicologists need regular insight into the 
composition of the atmosphere that is simply not 
possible when a limited number of samples are returned 
every 3 - 6 months. In addition, the capability to respond 
to unexpected contamination events is necessary to 
make informed decisions about whether the crew should 
remain onboard or make a hasty return to the ground. It 
is the ultimate goal of the ISS to develop and validate in- 
flight analytical capabilities so that reliance upon sample 
return is reduced and to pave the way toward long- 
duration exploration missions. Current onboard and 
archival instruments are listed in Table 1. 
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MONITORING CAPABILITIES - Stating the names of 
compounds detected only provides a glimpse of what a 
robust environmental monitoring program looks like. To 
provide a better understanding of current ISS 
capabilities, it is helpful to place all the components 
together on the same scale (a logarithmic scale is 
necessary) and then place the compounds into functional 
groups, which are roughly defined by the following 
factors: 
Typical concentration (or the concentration expected 
during a contingency event) 
I? Time to effect, either through a low or high 
concentration 
0 Toxicological priority (based on previous experience, 
presence on ISS and likelihood of release, impact on 
human health and performance) 
Figure 1 represents an integrated picture of the ISS 
onboard air monitoring system. For each compound, the 
orange triangles represent the SMAC 180 day limit and 
the book-ended bars indicate the detection capability of 
the relevant monitoring instrument. Approximate 
boundaries are shown for each instrument to better 
understand each individual contribution and identify gaps 
in coverage. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM ISS OPERATIONS 
Hardware Desian 
1. Onboard Validation and Calibration Standards. 
Once a complex analytical instrument is designed 
and built to measure compounds in the parts per 
billion range, how do we know it is working once it 
enters service? The Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) 
was validated by comparing in-flight measurements 
of common contaminants against archived samples 
that were taken at the same time. This process took 
many months and resulted in validation for 15 of the 
20 target compounds. This approach will not be 
CATEGORY INSTRUMENT * TECHNOLOGY ANALYTES 
Permanent Gases 
Gas chromatography / ion mobility 
spectrometry 
Over 20 volatile organic contaminants 
(can also detect unidentified I compounds) I Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) I Trace Contaminants I 
Major Constituents Analyzer (MCA) Magnetic sector mass spectrometry N2.02. C02. CH4, H2 
. 
Combustion 
Products 
GA (Russian Gas Analyzer) Electrochemical CO, C02, H20,02 
Carbon Dioxide Monitor (CDM) Infrared spectroscopy c 0 2  
Compound Specific Analyzer - Electrochemical CO, HCN, HCI, 0 2  
Combustion Products (CSA-CP) 
GANK (Russian Gas Analyzer) 02, HCI, HCN, CO, HF, NOx, 
IPD (Russian Manual Analyzer) Colorimetric tube HCI, HCN, CO, Formaldehyde 
Electrochemical, thermocatalytic, 
photometric tape Ammonia, Formaldehyde 
Table 1 ISS atmospheric monitoring instruments 
Archival (Ground 
Analysis) I 
possible for exploration missions, but even if we 
assume that only well-proven technologies will be 
used, problems still exist with this method. Many of 
Grab Sample Container (GSC) 
Formaldehyde Monitoring Kit (FMK) Colorimetric analysis Formaldehyde 
Gas chromatography / mass 
spectrometry 
All stable compounds 
the compounds that must be monitored should not 
be present unless a failure has occurred. 
Furthermore, when an air quality problem is detected 
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and difficult decisions must be made regarding crew 
safety, mission managers will need to quickly rule 
out the possibility of an instrument malfunction. 
Providing sample containers or other calibration 
standards containing a dilute mixture of common 
contaminants can provide in-flight validation and 
verify that an instrument is continuing to perform 
within specifications. 
2. Smaller is Better. It goes without saying in the age 
of Moore’s Law that complex electromechanical 
systems will become smaller and better over time, 
but nowhere is this principle more enabling than in 
spacecraft instruments. Consider the case of trace 
gas analyzers: by decreasing the size of the pre- 
concentrator, GC column, and detector, a number of 
indirect benefits are realized. The size and number 
of heaters are both reduced since less heat is lost in 
transit between the components and the thermal 
mass is lower. The overall power demand drops, and 
so does the need for insulation, cooling, and fuses, 
since there is less heat to deal with both during 
normal operations and in a potential runaway 
overheating contingency. Since the total volume of 
the sample path is reduced, less carrier gas is 
required and smaller pumps and valves are possible 
since the pressure and flow demands are less. With 
recent advances in micro-electromechanical 
systems, it is possible to envision in the not too 
distant future a handheld trace gas analyzer capable 
of meeting most of the requirements for long- 
duration missions. By working toward miniaturization 
of the air monitoring components, many unforeseen 
benefits will be realized in both design and 
operations. 
Interfaces With Other Svstems 
1. Understanding Control and Data Handling 
Requirements. The means by which the 
components of the monitoring system interface with 
the flight command and control system must be 
consistent with the priority of the information. For 
example, the Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) takes 
3 hours to complete a run, then the data must be 
downlinked for interpretation by experts on the 
ground. This is an acceptable delay for information 
that the crew does not need to immediately act upon, 
and the VOA does not need to be communicating via 
a real-time data bus. In fact, use of this specialized 
communication standard caused confusion that 
resulted in a serious software error, which will be 
discussed in the next section. By contrast, an 
instrument such as an electrochemical oxygen 
sensor could benefit greatly from being placed on a 
network that constantly commands it to take 
readings and relay them to the ground or onboard 
control systems. Data transfer should be prioritized 
based on how time-sensitive it is to onboard systems 
and ground experts. 
2. The Importance of Integrated Testing. The Volatile 
Organic Analyzer spent the first year of its 
operational life plagued by software lockups and 
reboots that were eventually traced to a line of code 
in the software interface with the 1553 data bus. A 
misinterpretation of the 1553 standard resulted in a 
corrupted array that built up over time and eventually 
consumed all the processing power of the onboard 
computer. Some indication of a problem with the 
software was observed during integrated ground 
testing with the US Lab Module computer system, 
however troubleshooting was not possible due to the 
tight pre-launch schedule. At the time, the VOA team 
did not have access to a simulator. Once problems 
were apparent on-orbit, many weeks of runtime with 
a 1553 simulator were required to pinpoint and fix 
the error. An investigation pointed toward incorrect 
interpretation of the software interface 
documentation, compounded by the lack of 
opportunity for long-term testing which would have 
caught the problem before flight. The VOA ran for 
hundreds of hours on the ground during calibration 
and acceptance testing, but this testing was not 
integrated with a flight-like data system. The 
irregularities that did occur during the Lab integrated 
test did not have time to build to the point that the 
onboard computer locked up, so it was concluded 
based on the data available that they were minor 
nuisances that could be resolved later. This is one of 
many examples in the history of space flight 
illustrating the importance of long-term integrated 
testing under flight-like conditions. 
3. Portable vs. Integrated Equipment. Early in the 
design phase, careful consideration should be given 
to the benefits and drawbacks with integrated 
systems, meaning semi-permanently installed 
hardware that makes continual use of higher-level 
resources. VOA is an example of an integrated 
system: it is installed in payload rack and requires 
power, data, air cooling, and nitrogen gas from the 
US Lab. This design was necessary due to the high 
demand VOA placed on all these resources. Future 
monitoring equipment can be expected to be 
smaller, lighter, and less resource intensive. It may 
be possible to make such equipment portable, with 
occasional recharging, re-filling, and data 
downloading. This design not only has the benefit of 
being portable, but also avoids significant 
engineering and testing costs associated with use of 
system-level resources. However, now the 
instrument requires a battery and charging system 
along with gas reservoirs, and it must be more 
rugged. Trade studies may determine that the 
vehicle still is best served by an integrated system, 
but this should not be a baseline assumption. 
Svstem Architecture 
1. Define Criticality and Failure Scenarios. Most of 
the current ISS environmental monitoring hardware 
was designed prior to the actual operation of the ISS 
or even the Shuttle-Mir Program and reflects the 
previous Space Shuttle paradigm regarding safety 
and criticality. All the monitoring systems (except for 
the combustion products monitor) were designated 
as Criticality 3, meaning that failure would not cause 
loss of crew or mission. These instruments monitor 
for failures of other systems and unknown risks that 
cannot be adequately predicted. The systems they, 
monitor were considered critical because their failure 
could cause immediate impacts to the mission. By 
contrast, the failure of a monitoring system causes a 
slow and steady accumulation of risk due to the lack 
of insight into the environment. Over time, this 
accumulated risk can pose a direct threat to the crew 
and mission because a problem that could have 
been diagnosed and resolved early can progress into 
a serious situation by the time crew symptoms or 
other indirect indications are present. Appropriate 
definitions of criticality depend on a complete 
understanding of the system impacts caused by a 
failure and how this affects overall mission risk. 
Tools such as operational scenarios and risk 
analysis can assist designers in this task. 
2. Integration with Water Quality. Currently, ISS has 
separate systems for air and water quality 
monitoring. In-flight chemical monitoring of water is 
currently limited to Total Organic Carbon, pH, and 
conductivity, but there is strong interest in expanding 
these capabilities to include identification of volatile 
organic compounds. A number of techniques are 
available for performing water analysis using a gas 
analyzer such as headspace analysis or 
vaporization. In addition, the source of many volatile 
organic compounds in spacecraft water is the 
atmosphere, through recovery and processing of 
condensate into usable water. It may be possible to 
predict the water concentration of some compounds 
based on the atmospheric concentration and 
modeling of the recovery process. Greater 
integration between air and water analyzers may 
he$ reduce the size and complexity of the water 
monitoring system. 
3. One System, Multiple Users. As mentioned earlier, 
the ISS air monitoring system developed along 
multiple independent paths, with different users 
building their own set of hardware. Since none of the 
parties could reach a comprehensive agreement on 
priorities or what the minimum complement of 
hardware should be, it was difficutt to see the system 
impacts of cutting out individual components when 
cost and schedule trade-offs had to be made, As a 
resutt, the current system has a number of gaps that 
the ISS program is now working to fill. Some of these 
gaps include real-time ammonia monitoring, portable 
reduced pressure oxygen monitoring (needed during 
the pre-breath protocol used before spacewalks), 
and continuous carbon monoxide monitoring in sleep 
areas. A new development model is needed to 
integrate the requirements for exploration systems. 
An alternative system architecture is presented in the 
next section of this paper. 
3 
AIR QUALITY MONITORING FOR 
EXPLORATION MISSIONS 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE - The development and 
operational history of the ISS Environmental Monitoring 
System illustrates the importance of a common vision for 
air monitoring requirements. Figure 2 depicts a common 
platform that all users of a future monitoring system 
might use to integrate their monitoring needs into a set of 
common system-level requirements. The specific 
applications that derive from monitoring requirements 
are often driven by similarities in the time-sensitivity of 
the data, the need for portability, and the technology 
available to perform the function, along with other 
factors. The evolution of the ISS system points toward 
some natural functional areas: immediate threat 
monitoring, closed-loop system process control, long- 
term humadsystem health monitoring, and broad- 
spectrum analysis vs. single component detection. 
Although the system is primarily organized by time- 
sensitivity, this does not imply that less time-critical data 
is less important, only that the need to act on it is more 
immediate. The placement of the communication and 
location categories are intentionally vague, since these 
details will need to be worked out as the system evolves. 
The main intention of this approach is to visualize the 
entire monitoring system in an integrated fashion and to 
assist mission designers in understanding the factors 
that may influence how the rest of the vehicle interacts 
with the system. In addition, a preliminary list of potential 
technologies is included along with some system-level 
integration issues that have been identified through the 
ISS experience. 
POTENTIAL AREAS FOR EXPANDED MONITORING - 
By carefully reviewing the ISS experience and 
considering the unique aspects of an exploration 
mission, it is possible to identify some topics requiring 
further research. The most obvious difference between 
exploration missions and ISS is that environmental 
samples will not be returned for ground analysis. 
Additionally, the longer period of isolation gives rise to 
greater concerns about long-term exposure to trace 
pollutants. It is also likely that new life support 
technologies will be in use, including ecological life 
support systems and increased closure of water and 
waste loops, which have the potential to introduce new 
pollutants. Another unique consideration will be surface 
operations bringing in material such as dust, frozen or 
condensed volatile organic compounds, and possibly 
even Martian microbes. 
The following is a list of areas that the AIM working 
group would like to consider for further research and 
trade studies to determine if technology development is 
warranted: 
1. Byproducts of Ecological Life Support Systems. 
The definition of ecological life support used here is 
any system that sets up an artificial ecology for 
sustaining human life. Some of these systems are 
present on ISS, but many more will be included in an 
exploration mission to recycle water, wastes, and 
breathable air, and most processes are capable of 
producing volatile byproducts through chemical 
reactions or microbial metabolism. Often, 
unexpected byproducts are produced in such small 
quantities that they are not detected during materials 
integration issues Functional Group Time-Sensitivity , Comniunications Location Technology 
or system off -gas testing. Long-term closed loop 
testing is the only method to discover these 
problems before a mission. 
2. Airborne Microbes. Microbes that were originally 
considered benign can become pathogenic over time 
when humans are isolated from the outside world. 
Current ISS technology only attempts to quanttfy 
total bacterial loads in the air. To study the presence 
and evolution of airborne microbes over time, 
microbiologists require frequent sampling and 
culturing capabilities, either inside the test faciltty or 
through analysis of samples in outside labs. 
3. Planetary Protection. Another reason to monitor 
and control airborne microbes is the potential for 
contamination of the planetary surface. Since one of 
NASA's primary reasons for exploring other planets 
is to determine is life is present or was present at 
some time in the past, care must be taken to avoid 
contaminating the pristine environment around the 
spacecraft. Since maintaining a sterile environment 
is not necessarily practical or even beneficial, it will 
be helpful to know exactly what strains of bacteria 
are present onboard the spacecraft to rule out 
terrestrial sources of any discoveries. 
4. Particulate Contamination. Dust will be a constant 
companion during surface operations on the Moon or 
Mars, and monitoring may be required to ensure that 
airborne particulates do not present a threat to 
human health. Just as trace contaminant limits are 
set well below levels used by terrestrial regulatory 
agencies due to unknowns regarding the 
environment and human immune response in space, 
particulate limits can be expected to be stringent on 
a planetary surface. 
With a comprehensive architecture that integrates all the 
potential users of the air monitoring system, it is possible 
to begin work on a plan that will guide specific technology 
development efforts toward a common goal of supporting 
long duration human exploration missions. However, this 
discussion is intended to serve only as a starting point. 
The next logical step is to establish an Advanced Air 
Monitoring Working Group that integrates the ISS 
stakeholders and experience base with the advanced life 
support community. Such a group could be chartered to 
develop detailed requirements for different exploration 
mission scenarios and produce conceptual designs for 
the various air monitoring systems. Additional 
recommendations for the group follow. 
Recommendations for Advanced Air Monitorinq Workinq 
Group: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Develop listing of compounds monitored on ISS 
along with driiers to determine whether they are 
specific ISS concerns or generic to all closed 
systems. 
Research history of air quality requirements and 
monitoring systems of spacecraft and other 
analogous closed systems to capture lessons 
learned. 
Develop a hazardous/volatile materials tracking 
database for advanced life support systems and 
experiments. Any experiment or system proposed 
should be required to submit inputs. All materials 
capable of off-gassing or toxic releases should be 
included such as plastics, electronic components, 
foams, and lubricants. 
4. Present a potential design for the first AIM Test. 
Include operational scenarios, resources required, 
command and data handling, and crew interaction. 
5. Identify opportunities for the ISS to be used as a test 
bed to prove out advanced air monitoring technology 
and operational concepts. 
CONCLUSION 
By working early in the planning phase for exploration 
missions, a more integrated and efficient atmospheric 
monitoring system can be developed by considering the 
overall system architecture and how each component 
should interact with the crew, ground experts, and other 
systems. With this framework in place, mission planners 
and ground test facilities can readily see the impacts of 
trades and design decisions on crew health and safety. 
Ground testing of advanced life support systems 
provides an excellent opportunity to integrate the 
experience gained through ISS atmospheric monitoring 
with the unique requirements imposed on exploration 
missions, with the ultimate goal of providing dependable 
and effective monitoring equipment to help ensure the 
success of future missions. 
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